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Three Essays on the Economics
of Evaluating Social Programs
Jeffrey Smith

This dissertation consists of three essays on the
evaluation of social programs. All three essays consider
general evaluation questions in the specific context of
evaluating the impact of government job training
programs on the earnings of those who participate in
them.
The first essay, jointly authored with James
Heckman, examines three issues related to
"Ashenfelter's dip"-the empirical regularity that the
mean earnings of participants in employment and
training programs generally decline during the period
just prior to participation. This pattern was originally
identified in Ashenfelter (1978) and has since been
observed for participants in many other employment
and training programs.
The first implication of Ashenfelter's dip for
econometric evaluation research is the question it raises
about what would have happened to participants had
they not participated. The fundamental evaluation
problem is that no person is ever observed
simultaneously as both a participant and a
nonparticipant in the program being evaluated. That is,
in the context of a training program, the most that is
ever observed is either what happens to the person if he
or she did take training or what happens to the person if
he or she did not take training, but never both. The
difficult part of evaluations is constructing the
unobserved counterfactual outcome that participants
would have obtained had they not participated. This
counterfactual is needed in order to determine the
impact that the program has on its participants.
Ashenfelter's dip makes it clear that participants are
systematically different from nonparticipants in the
period prior to participation, and raises the question of
whether the earnings and employment losses reflected
in the dip are permanent or transitory.
I address this question in Chapter II. Using
experimental data from the recent National JTPA Study
(NJS), I show what the counterfactual mean outcome is
for participants. In a properly designed experiment, the
outcomes of the experimental control group indicate
what would have happened to participants had they not
participated. Using the controls from the NJS, I show
that for adult males and females, and for male and
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female youth, the dip in mean earnings is transitory. In
each case, the mean returns to its pre-dip level within
six months after random assignment. For all the groups
other than adult males, the dip is followed by growth in
the earnings mean above pre-random-assignment levels
in the post-random-assignment period.
This counterfactual earnings behavior has important
implications for the most commonly used simple
estimators of program impacts. These implications
constitute the second issue addressed in Chapter II. I
show that the pattern of earnings displayed by the
control group indicates that before-after estimators, in
which the pre-program experience of participants
themselves serves as the estimate of the counterfactual
outcome, are upwardly biased, with the extent of the
upward bias depending on the particular "before" and
"after" periods used to construct the estimates. This
strong upward bias is consistent with the large positive
impact estimates obtained in early evaluations of
federal employment and training programs in the
United States that used such comparisons.
More recent evaluations use a comparison group of
nonparticipants whose earnings behavior serves as a
benchmark against which to compare the earnings
behavior of the program participants. The simplest, and
most widely used, comparison group estimator is the
"difference-in-differences" estimator, in which the
before-after earnings change of the comparison group
is subtracted from the before-after earnings change of
the participants. This estimator is motivated by a model
in which persons select into a program based on a
fixed, person-specific component of earnings. This
componentis then differenc,ed out in the estimation
procedure. I evaluate the performance of the
difference-in-differences estimator relative to the
experimental estimates using two different comparison
groups. The first consists of ITPA-eligible
nonparticipants (ENPs) from four of the sites in the
NJS and the second consists of a national sample of
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persons eligible for JTPA drawn from the 1986 Full
Panel of the Survey of Income and Program
Participation (SIPP). Both samples are superior to the
comparison group data used in earlier studies. In
particular, the ENPs are drawn from the same local
labor markets and administered the same surveys as the
experimental sample. Both the ENPs and the SIPP
eligibles are all known to be eligible for JTPA. Though
the ENP sample generally performs better than the
SIPP sample in the sense that the estimates obtained
using it are closer to the experimental benchmark, for
both samples the difference-in-differences estimates
differ substantially from the experimental estimates.
These differences result primarily from the postprogram earnings growth observed for the controls.
This growth is not observed in the comparison group
samples for most demographic groups, with the result
that the difference-in-differences estimates also tend to
show an upward bias. Furthermore, the estimates are
quite sensitive to the "before" and "after" periods used
in constructing them. This sensitivity results in part
from the post-program earnings growth, and in part
from the effects of Ashenfelter's dip, which is also not
observed in either comparison group.
The regular appearance of Ashenfelter's dip among
participants in a wide variety of employment and
training programs has led later researchers such as
Ashenfelter and Card (1985) and Card and Sullivan
(1988) to focus on employment and earnings processes
as the driving forces behind participation in
employment and training programs when constructing
econometric models of the participation process. The
final section of Chapter II examines what can be
learned about the determinants of participation in JTPA
from the ENP and control data from the NJS for the
four training centers for which both samples are
available.
This analysis reveals that the earlier literature's focus
exclusively on earnings and employment, which was
motivated in part by Ashenfelter's dip and in part by the
limitations ofthe available data, leaves out an important
part of the story. I find that labor force status, defined as
the usual CPS trinity of employed, unemployed, and
out of the labor force, plays an important role in the
participation process beyond that played by earnings or
employment. Using as a metric the ability to predict
who among the combined ENP and control samples
will and will not participate, I find that labor force
status patterns in the seven months up to and including
the month of the participation decision do better than
measures based solely on earnings or employment,
particularly for groups other than adult males. The
patterns most likely to lead to participation in JTPA are
a recent transition into unemployment from either
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employment or from out of the labor force. Among
those employed or out of the labor force at the time of
the participation decision, those who have recently
entered these states are relatively more likely to
participate in JTPA than those who have not. Thus,
participants tend to be those whose labor force status is
in flux, particularly the recently unemployed. This
finding is consistent with the fact that both JTPA and its
predecessor programs CETA and MDTA provide not
only traditional classroom training, but also job search
assistance and placement services that would be of
interest to unemployed persons looking for immediate
employment rather than for more traditional classroom
training.
Chapter III, which is also jointly authored with
James Heckman, examines the determinants of
selection into the JTPA program more broadly. Rather
than focusing on a single transition from eligibility to
acceptance as in the first essay, the enrollment process
is decomposed into a series of stages, from eligibility
for JTPA, to awareness of JTPA, to acceptance into
JTPA and finally to formal enrollment in the program.
Decomposing the process in this way indicates the
sources of observed demographic differences in JTPA
participation rates that have troubled some observers of
the program. It also sheds light on the extent to which
demographic differences result from individual selfselection or from the actions of program administers.
Because JTPA is not an entitlement program likeAFDC
or Food Stamps, program administrators have
substantial discretion over whom to serve and how to
serve them. There is a concern that the structure of the
bureaucratic performance standards system within
JTPA encourages program bureaucrats to "creamskim" by bringing in only the most employable persons
within the JTPA-eligible population.
Chapter III begins with a systematic analysis of the
determinants of the transition at each stage of the
overall process of enrollment in JTPA, while the final
section presents decompositions that combine some or
all of the stages and reveal the relative importance of
particular factors at different stages. This analysis
yields several important findings. First, I find some
evidence consistent with cream-skimming by program
bureaucrats. Most of this evidence is concentrated at
the stage from acceptance into the program (indicated
here by random assignment) and formal enrollment.
Second, I find that informational barriers such as lack
of fluency in English and low levels of completed
schooling act to discourage participation conditional on
eligibility, but that these differences do not fully
account for the differentially low rate of Hispanic
enrollment in JTPA found in other studies. Third, I
show that the importance of labor force status
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transitions, already pointed out in Chapter II, is
concentrated at the stage from awareness of JTPA to
acceptance into it. Fourth, I show that the participation
patterns of AFDC and Food Stamp recipients differ
markedly from those of other groups. They are
relatively more likely to be aware of the program than
other eligibles, but less likely to enroll in the program
conditional on acceptance. Finally, and more broadly,
this analysis shows that manipulation of program
eligibility rules constitutes a weak tool for increasing
the participation of particular groups. Some groups,
including some cited as being particularly in need of
JTPA services, have much lower rates of participation
conditional on eligibility than do others. Increasing the
participation of these groups requires more active
measures than simply broadening the eligibility rules to
include them.
In Chapter IV, I focus on the measurement of
earnings dynamics among the low-income population
eligible for training in JTPA. This essay is part of a
larger project that also examines the measurement of
earnings levels within this population. Accurate
measurement of both the level and temporal pattern of
earnings is crucial to obtaining reliable estimates of
program impact and of the determinants of program
participation.
Chapter IV compares the dynamics of mean
earnings in two samples of persons eligible for training
under JTPA. The first sample is drawn from the 1988
Full Panel of the Survey of Income and Program
Participation (SIPP), while the second is a sample of
eligible nonparticipants (ENPs) at four of the sixteen
sites in the National JTPA Study. These are the same
two samples used as comparison groups in Chapter 11with the exception that the SIPP sample is drawn from'
the 1988 panelrather than the 1986 panel. In that
chapter, I show that the structure of the eligibility rules
for the JTPA program, which require either low family
income in the six months prior to application or
participation in certain means-tested transfer programs
at the time of application, can lead to a dip in the mean
family income of eligibles in the months just prior to
the month of measured eligibility. Examining this result
empirically in Chapter IV, I find that this dip appears in
the mean individual earnings of adult male and adult
female SIPP eligibles but not in the mean individual
earnings of the ENPs. The failure of the dip to appear in
the data on the individual earnings of youth can be
explained by the fact that the earnings of youth
typically represent only a small portion of total family
income, which is the income that counts for JTPA
eligibility. In contrast, the absence of a dip in the mean
earnings of adult ENPs is more difficult to account for.
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I examine two alternative explanations for the
difference in earnings dynamics between the two
samples. The first is that the lack of a dip in the mean
earnings of adult ENPs is accounted for by the
exclusion of areas with low poverty rates from the ENP
sampling frame. Persons eligible for JTPA in areas with
low poverty rates are differentially nonpoor. At the
same time, in the SIPP sample, nonpoor eligibles show
a much more powerful dip in mean earnings prior to
measured eligibility, as they must in order to be become
eligible for the program. I show that the number of
nonpoor eligibles excluded at the four sites in the
National JTPA Study is too small to account for the
absence of a dip in mean earnings in the ENP sample.
The second explanation builds on differences in the
survey instruments used to collect earnings data on the
two samples. The survey administered to the ENPs
resembles that used for the National Longitudinal
Survey of Youth in that both surveys collect earnings
information indirectly through questions about
particular job spells. On the two ENP surveys, for each
job reported in an interview, one value for average
hours worked per week is collected. Two values for the
rate of pay, the starting wage and the current or ending
wage, are collected for most jobs paid by the hour. For
other jobs, only the pay period (week, month, etc.) and
the usual pay per period are collected. Collecting the
data in this way implicitly removes all variation within
job spells in hours worked or in rate of pay. The
additional information collected in both surveys on
overtime pay, tips and bonuses, as well as the limited
information on weeks worked without pay collected on
the follow-up survey, also has no variation within job
spells. Thus, the structure of the survey instruments
administered to the ENPs forces all of the temporal
variation in measured earnings for individual ENPs to
result from either job loss, job gain, or crossing the
seam between the time periods covered in the two
surveys.
In contrast, the SIPP survey collects earnings
information directly from questions about earnings in
each month on each of the two jobs for which the
respondent reports working the most hours in each
four-month SIPP survey reference period. Information
on earnings from businesses is collected in the same
way. This method of collecting earnings information
allows variation in earnings from month to month on
each job. Furthermore, by having interviews every four
months, the SIPP respondents are less likely to forget
periods of increased or reduced earnings that might be
lost in the ENP surveys due to the long (five years for
the baseline survey and 18 months or more for the
follow-up survey) recall periods required.
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If the dip in mean earnings prior to eligibility results
primarily from job loss and job gain, then both surveys
should, in principle, pick it up. On the other hand, if the
dip results primarily from within-spell reductions in
earnings due to periods of absence from work without
pay, reduced overtime or temporary layoff, then only
the SIPP instrument will capture it in the data. To shed
some light on which of these two hypotheses is the
correct one, I smooth out the SIPP data by taking the
total earnings from each employment spell and
assigning an equal fraction to each month of the spell.
This replicates the smoothing induced in the ENP
earnings data by the ENP survey instrument.
Examination of the smoothed SIPP data reveals that the
smoothing process removes the dip in mean earnings in
the months prior to measured eligibility. The same
result obtains when the SIPP earnings are smoothed
over job spells rather than employment spells. These
findings constitute strong evidence that the lack of a dip
among the ENPs results from the failure of the survey
instruments administered to that sample to effectively
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capture the within-spell changes in earnings that
underlie the dip in the mean earnings of JTPA eligibles.
More generally, these findings show that choices about
survey design have important implications for our
ability to accurately measure earnings dynamics among
the poor.
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